This paper provides evidence that some cities subject to a statewide tax limit manipulate their mix of productive and administrative services in an attempt to get voters to override the statewide limit. When a statewide limit reduces a city's budget, one manipulative response is to cut "service" inputs (for example, teachers or uniformed police officers) by a relatively large amount, while cutting administrative inputs by a relatively small amount. This approach reveals a relatively large trade-off between public and private goods, and the severe consequences from a tax limit may encourage local voters to override the statewide limit. We provide evidence that cities with local-override options tend to adopt this approach. Manipulation is most prevalent among cities run by city managers (as opposed to strong mayors).
atively large trade-off between public and private goods, and the severe consequences from a tax limit may encourage local voters to override the statewide limit. We provide evidence that cities with local-override options tend to adopt this approach. Manipulation is most prevalent among cities run by city managers (as opposed to strong mayors).
Previous studies have shown that voters' predictions of the consequence of tax limits differ from the actual consequences. In anticipation of the vote on Proposition 13 in California, 38 percent of voters believed that state and local governments could absorb a 40 percent cut in tax revenue without cutting services. 1 In both Massachusetts and Michigan, a majority of citizens believed that tax limitation measures would have no effect or a very small effect on public services.
2 But these forecast effects are inconsistent with the actual outcomes of tax limits. In terms of actual consequence, Thomas Downes and David Figlio show that tax limits increased student-teacher ratios, decreased teacher salaries, did not affect administrative spending, and reduced test scores; Figlio and Kim Rueben show that tax limits are associated with reduced teacher quality.
3 Maura Doyle shows that tax limits reduced the quality of municipal fire service. 4 Downes, Richard Dye, and Therese McGuire show that tax limits in the Chicago area decreased math scores by a small amount but did not affect reading scores. 5 Our simple theoretical model suggests that a city may manipulate the tradeoff between public and private goods to encourage voters to override a statewide limit. To test this hypothesis, we use balance-sheet data from 5,150 U.S. cities. We measure the service ratio as the ratio of spending on police and fire protection to spending on general administration. In the years following the adoption of a statewide tax limit, the service ratio decreases by a relatively large amount in cities that have a local-override option. Among cities with override options, the largest reductions in the service ratio occur in cities whose citizens have the least interjurisdictional mobility and in cities run by city managers. These results are not driven by population differences across the cities and are apparently not driven by endogeneity problems. Data from within single spending categories provides corroborating evidence: school districts with override options decrease teacher-administrator ratios by larger amounts, and police departments in large override cities decrease officer-administrator ratios by larger amounts.
I. A Model of Manipulative Local Government
There has been some research on manipulative government and on the local government responses to tax limits. Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal show that if the reversion budget (the budget adopted if voters do not approve a proposed budget) is sufficiently far from the voters' preferred budget, voters will approve a budget that exceeds their preferred budget. 6 In the models of Kangoh Lee and Eugenia Toma and Mark Toma, bureaucratic effort is endogenous, and bureaucrats can respond to a tax limit by shirking more, thus reducing the impacts of a tax limit. 7 Downes suggests that Proposition 13 caused some bureaucrats (who care about both output and staffing levels) to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of the median voter (who cares about output). 8 To motivate our model of a manipulative local government, consider the response of a city government to a budget cut caused by a statewide tax limit. The city produces a local public good with two inputs, an administrative input (a) and a service input (s), for example, teachers or uniformed police officers. City officials have a payoff function , which is not necessarily the same p [a, s] as the production function . One response to a budget cut is to simply g [a, s] scale back both inputs to maximize the officials' current payoff, taking the smaller budget as exogenous. The second option is to deviate from this year's payoffmaximizing input bundle in an attempt to persuade local voters to override the statewide limit. A relatively large cut in the service input will cause a relatively large decrease in public output, meaning that voters may be more likely to override the limit. A city with an override option may sacrifice part of its current payoff in anticipation of a bigger budget and a higher payoff in a later period.
Consider a city with a fixed population. The city's budget constraint is b p , where is the budget and the prices of both inputs are fixed at one. The a ϩ s b representative citizen has a fixed income y and preferences over a private good (x) and the two public inputs. The budget constraint and utility function of the representative citizen are, respectively, and . y p x ϩ b vp x ϩ u(a, s) Figure 1 shows the solution to the city's input-choice problem for an exogenous budget . At the payoff-maximizing bundle (shown by point j), the price ratio b 0 equals the ratio of the marginal payoffs. We assume that the city has a bias toward administrative inputs: the city's decision makers, who are of course ad- Figure 1 ministrators, have a bias toward the inputs over which they have the most direct control. At the payoff-maximizing point, the citizens' marginal rate of substitution between the two inputs ( ) is less than the price ratio, meaning the indifference u /u a s curve passing through point j is flatter than the isopayoff curve. In period 1, there is a statewide budget limitation, with , and the city
responds by picking a new input bundle. At the state level, the rationale for the budget limitation is presumably that in a majority of municipalities, the initial budget exceeds the utility-maximizing level. The statewide limit is presumably too high in some municipalities, too low in others, but on average just right. We assume that the limit equals the budget that would maximize citizen utility in a nonmanipulative city, given the constraint that the city has a bias toward administrative inputs.
Consider first a city that has no control over its budget, that is, a city with no opportunity for manipulative behavior. 9 In Figure 1 , the expansion path E shows the solution to the input choice problem for different exogenous budgets. Along this expansion path, suppose utility is maximized at point e, so the statewide limit is , the solution to the problem of maximizing . To
simplify the algebra, suppose , so the nonmanipulative path is dea p s p 1 0 0 scribed by . Substituting this expression and the input budget constraint a p s into the utility function,
[ ]
The first-order condition for the budget (
, so the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. A dollar allocated to a 1 nonmanipulative city with will be split equally between the two a p s p 1 0 0 inputs, so the marginal benefit is half the sum of the marginal utilities.
A city with an override option may have an incentive to pick an input bundle in period 1 that differs from the input bundle that would maximize its payoff in that period. The choice of a different input bundle reveals a different expansion path to citizens, who may decide to override the statewide budget limit in period 2. In Figure 2 , the manipulative expansion path M includes the initial input bundle ( ) and is described by a , s
where v is the city's choice variable. For , the manipulative path is the v p 1 same as the nonmanipulative path; for , the manipulative path is steeper, v ! 1 for example, path M. Voters will override the statewide limit if utility is increasing in the city budget. In Figure 2 , point t shows the status quo following the budget limit. Given the city's response to the budget limit, citizens have the option of maintaining the budget determined by the statewide limit. If, starting at this point, utility is increasing in the budget, the citizens will override the limit and approve a larger budget.
For utility to be increasing in the budget, the first-order conditions for utility maximization must be violated at the status quo. If , the manipa p s p 1 0 0 ulative path is described by . Using the budget constraint a p (1 Ϫ v) ϩ vs , the input choices in terms of the budget and v are b p a ϩ s
There remains the possibility that this city has an incentive to manipulate its outcomes in hopes of a state bailout. This possibility does not affect the conclusions of the model or its empirical predictions. Plugging these expressions into the utility function,
The first-order condition for the budget b implies
If one starts with the input bundle chosen by the city under the budget limit, this condition would be violated if
In this case, the limit budget would be less than the utility-maximizing budget tax limitation measures under the manipulative expansion path M. Therefore, citizens would override the limit, approving a larger budget. A manipulative city could choose v to ensure that, starting from the status quo budget, utility is increasing in the budget. Consider a small deviation from the nonmanipulative outcome (shown by point e). For , the first-order condition v p 1 for the budget implies . Assuming the city has a bias toward adu ϩ u p 2 a s ministrative inputs, . Together these two conditions imply
that for , and . As v decreases, the city increases the admin-
istrative input at the expense of the service input. Assuming diminishing marginal utility for both public inputs, will decrease (further below 1.0) and will u u a s increase (further above 1.0). At the same time, in the first-order condition, as v decreases, the weight associated with the administrative input decreases, while the weight on the service input increases. As a result, the first-order condition will be violated for some , with utility increasing in the budget.
The distortion of the input bundle encourages voters to override the statewide limit because it increases the marginal benefit of public spending. The marginal benefit is higher for two reasons. First, a relatively large fraction of an extra dollar allocated to city government will be allocated to the service input. Second, the service input has a relatively high utility payoff, given its relatively low level in the allocation chosen under the budget limit.
The city trades off its payoffs in periods 1 and 2. By deviating from the expansion path E, it sacrifices part of its payoff in period 1 to get a larger budget-and a higher payoff-in period 2. In Figure 2 , the choice is between twice the payoff associated with point e or the lower period-1 payoff associated with point t plus the higher period-2 payoff associated with point f. Manipulation will be rational if the sacrifice in period 1 is small relative to the bonus in period 2.
In our simple model, voters cannot penalize the municipal government for manipulative behavior that decreases utility. The population is fixed, so foot voting in the spirit of Charles Tiebout, Paul Courant, Edward Gramlich, and Daniel Rubinfeld and Dennis Epple and Allan Zelenitz is not possible. 10 Similarly, voters cannot replace manipulative public officials with others offering a better bundle of public and private goods. In a model with migration or politics, there would be some additional costs associated with manipulative behavior: a loss in population would decrease the tax base, or a loss of votes for the incumbent would decrease the probability of reelection. As a result, the net payoff from manipulative behavior would be lower. The qualitative conclusions would not change, however: if the benefits of manipulation (the extra payoff in period 2) exceed the cost (the payoff sacrifice in period 1 plus other costs resulting from migration or politics), a city with an override option will pick a relatively large ratio of administrative inputs to service inputs.
The testable implication of our model is that local governments in tax limit states with override provisions will decrease their service inputs relative to their administrative inputs by a larger degree than will those in tax limit states without override provisions, ceteris paribus. The magnitude of this effect may be affected by migration or politics: specifically, one would expect that the difference between override municipalities and no-override municipalities should decrease with migration potential and with the ability of constituents to replace manipulative public officials. In the following sections, we directly test these propositions.
A natural question is whether citizens in an override state are made better off or worse off by the override provision. Our results suggest that municipalities in override states manipulate voters, picking inefficient input ratios in an attempt to increase government spending. In other words, there are negative consequences or costs associated with override provisions. On the positive side, an override provision allows an individual city to deviate from an overly strict statewide limit, so there are benefits as well. In a state with substantial diversity in demand for local public goods across municipalities, the benefits could outweigh the costs, making it rational for a majority of citizens to support override provisions.
II. Empirical Evidence
Our goal is to model empirically how local governments substitute between the provision of basic services and spending on administration during the years surrounding a tax limit. Our empirical strategy is to look back at the states that imposed different types of tax limits during the tax revolt and observe patterns that are common to local governments in these states.
It is possible to identify the unique effects of tax limitations on the relationship between service provision and administrative provision in part because different states imposed tax limitations at different times. In order to pursue this line of inquiry, we require annual panel data on local government resource allocation in the years surrounding the tax revolt.
There is no perfect way to measure a local government's ratio of basic services provided to administrative overhead. Our data set, the Annual Survey of Governments, provides financial information for the cities broken down into fine categories, however, so a reasonable approximation can be made. For the purpose of this study, we define basic services as spending on police and fire protection 11 and administrative overhead as spending on general government, excluding financial administration and general public buildings. We find, however, that all results presented in this paper are robust to the inclusion of either financial administration or general public building expenditure, or both, in the definition of administrative overhead. These definitions are certainly not perfect: surely many could argue that other services-such as parks, libraries, or highways-belong under the category of "basic public services," for example; police and fire protection spending certainly includes some overhead of its own; and the expenditure class that we identify as overhead may include spending on basic services as well. However, given the data constraints for our annual panel analysis, we could not think of any more compelling way to measure relative changes in administration-to-service spending than the ratio of spending on police and fire protection divided by spending on general government.
To carry out this analysis, we utilize an unbalanced panel using data from the Annual Surveys of Governments for fiscal years 1975-86. These data, collected as a quasi-census of governmental finances, provide detailed annual balancesheet data for all U.S. cities with over 25,000 residents and the majority of those with 2,000-25,000 residents. 12 We include cities into our panel subject to the following selection criteria: (1) the local government is a municipality or township in the contiguous United States, excluding the District of Columbia; (2) the Annual Survey of Governments has data for the city in at least 7 of the 12 years of the study; and (3) the city had at least 2,000 residents during the entire sample.
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All but one local government with over 2,000 residents had substantial spending in each category that we consider. In all, 5,147 cities make our cut, yielding us 50,702 observations in our sample.
There are numerous factors that could affect a local government's choice of a ratio of basic services to administrative overhead (we denote this ratio for city i in year t as ), many of which are unobservable to the researcher. But we s it presume that these unobservable factors that are unique to a city are time invariant (at least over the course of our 12-year sample period) and that time-variant unobservable factors that might affect (for example, business cycles) are s it common to all cities within a region. Subject to these assumptions, we estimate variants of the equation for city i in region j during year : t
where is a time-invariant, city-specific fixed effect, is a region-specific time
fixed effect, is a dichotomous variable representing that city i in year t is l ijt subject to a tax limitation, and represents city i's population in time t, which x it is included to capture city-specific effects of scale economies, as well as the local unemployment rate in time t, and is a random error term. It is unclear e ijt 12 We use the 1977 Census of Governments (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Governments (1977)), which is universal, to supplement the Annual Survey of Governments (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Governments (1977) ) in that year. 13 The Annual Survey of Governments, supra note 12, also samples cities with fewer than 2,000 residents, but we exclude them from our study, because of the concern that very small local governments might not spend in the major spending categories that we consider.
whether population should be in the empirical model as an explanatory variable, given its potential endogeneity; it turns out that our results are virtually identical if we omit population from the model. We correct our standard errors for heteroskedasticity and within-city error correlation using the correction suggested by Brent Moulton. 14 We are better able to identify tax limitation effects because the timing of limit passage varies across states. We identify this timing using the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations's publications Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 15 as well as relying on the specific language is the limitation laws themselves. Following evidence presented in Anne Preston and Casey Ichniowski and Figlio, we count as limits only those laws that restrict total tax levies, revenues, or expenditures or those that limit both the tax rate and assessment growth.
16 Previous research has shown that merely limiting tax rates without capping assessment growth as well is ineffective. We do not measure at first the severity of the limits. In all, 17 states passed new limits on municipalities (by our definition) during the sample period. About one-quarter of all limited cities in our sample also had override options. We define in all years in l p 1 ijt which the city is subject to the state's limitation. In a few cases, a state imposed two limits in rapid succession (for example, in 1978 then again in 1980); in these cases, we define the variables according to the year in which the first limitation l ijt went into effect.
The central predictions of the theory, of course, are based on estimated differences between cities subject to tax limits with override provisions and those subject to tax limits without override provisions. In order to gauge whether cities in limit states that allow for overrides differed significantly in their responses to tax limits from cities not subject to override provisions, we estimate a variant of the equation spelled out above:
where represents that city i's state's limitation permits local voter overrides o i of the tax limit. Therefore, the coefficient of particular interest is f, which provides the evidence for differential responses to tax limitation status that vary systematically with whether the tax limitation has a local override provision.
Are Override States Different?
Estimating the equation described above is valid only to the extent to which the decision to allow overrides in a tax limitation is random. But one might reasonably suspect that tax limitations that provide for local overrides may simply be different in other dimensions than are tax limitations that do not make this type of provision or that the states that have these two types of tax limitations are systematically different. The difference between cities in override and nooverride states could just be due to differences in the severity of limits between override and no-override states or systematic differences in the demographic characteristics of override and no-override states. If this is the case, then our "natural experiment" of looking at differences in override versus no-override states to explore local government responses to incentives to behave manipulatively may be suspect. However, we have reason to believe that this is not the case. Table 1 reports differences between no-tax-limit states, override-limit states, and no-override-limit states in a variety of correlates, as well as the dependent variable and three different measures of limit severity. We observe that there is no significant difference between override and no-override states in the prelimit measures of our three dependent variables from the preceding analyses (A, B, or C in Table 1 ), or in the prelimit changes in these variables (that is, we find no evidence to suggest that local governments in override versus no-override states were on different revenue or expenditure growth paths prior to the imposition of the limit, and municipalities in override states were not changing their resource allocations in a systematically different manner in the years prior to the limit's imposition). In addition, there is no observable difference between the states in the prelimit values of various demographic and economic characteristics of the states (rows E through K). Therefore, there appears to be nothing systematically different-at least along these grounds-between the states that eventually passed tax limits with override provisions and those that passed tax limits without override provisions.
Perhaps more important, there is no significant evidence that override limits are more severe than no-override limits, at least on the basis of four measures of limit severity: (1) the percentage of cities with 2 percent or greater reductions in per capita own-source revenues in the 2 years following limit imposition, (2) the percentage of cities with 5 percent or greater reductions in per capita own-source revenues in the 2 years following limit imposition, (3) the percentage of cities with 2 percent or greater reductions in per capita property tax revenues in the 2 years following limit imposition, and (4) the percentage of cities with 5 percent or greater reductions in per capita property tax revenues in the 2 years following limit imposition. In measures based on own-source revenue changes, limits in no-override states look slightly more severe, while in measures based on property tax revenue changes, override limits look slightly more severe, but none of the differences is statistically significant. (See Table 1 , rows L through O.) In sum, it appears as if the ability to override a tax limit arbitrarily appeared in some laws but not in others.
One possible cause of this arbitrariness involves differences in state constitutional wording. Specifically, some states permit "direct legislation" from voters, while others do not. We observe that 86 percent of the tax limits that did not include override provisions occurred in states that allow direct legislation, so their tax limits were either passed directly by voters or passed by legislatures in states where voters had the power to make law directly. On the other hand, only one-third of the tax limits permitting overrides were passed in direct-legislation states. Looking at the data a slightly different way, two-thirds of direct-legislation states passed tax limits during the tax revolt, while just 22 percent of states without direct legislation possibilities passed limits during this time period. Conditional on passage of a tax limit, 14 percent of direct legislation states with tax Note.-Robust p-values of differences (two-tailed test) are reported in parentheses beneath estimated differences. These results are derived from estimation of equations as described in the text. The results control for city-specific effects, city population, local unemployment rate, and time-specific effects. Number of observations p 50,702. Number of cities p 5,147.
limits have a local override provision, while two-thirds of states without direct legislation possibilities but with tax limits wrote local-override provisions into their laws. Hence, it appears that, more than anything else, an arbitrary feature of state constitutions may have determined whether or not a new tax limit law included an override provision.
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Empirical Results
Our first evidence on the differential impact of tax limits by override status on the ratio of police and fire spending to administrative spending is presented in the first row of Table 2 . This model specification involves estimating solely a mean effect of tax limitation imposition, for override and no-override states, and does not permit tax limitation effects to vary across time. We observe that, on average in the years following a tax limitation, no-override tax limitation states do not change their service ratios relative to no-limit states (column 1). On the other hand, override limit states differ significantly from no-override limit states: column 3 demonstrates that override limit states reduce their relative police and fire spending by .26 more than no-override limit states, a difference significant at any conventional level. Therefore, this result presents our first evidence that local governments in states that imposed limits behaved strategically in an attempt to get their constituents to override the limit. 18 The full set of regression results from this specification are presented in Appendix Table A1 . 19 One might be concerned that we are treating tax limitations as exogenous (and only instrumenting for the override provision) in the above-mentioned instrumental variables (IV) analysis. If we restrict our IV analysis to include only tax limitation states, we observe an IV coefficient on the override versus no-override difference of Ϫ.967
. The relevant ordinary least squares comparison is Ϫ.266 ( p p 0.000)
. Therefore, our treatment of tax limitations in general does not ( p p 0.025) appear to influence our general IV finding that the Table 2 results are conservative estimates of the override versus no-override differences in service ratio changes following a tax limitation.
This result is large in magnitude as well as statistical significance. The estimated service ratio change of Ϫ.26 associated with an override provision is large relative to 1.766, the mean value of the dependent variable in override states in the year directly before tax limitation imposition. Since on average per capita spending on police, fire, and administration combined fell by about 4 percent in override limit states following the tax revolt, the estimated change in the service ratio associated with an override limit implies that per capita combined police and fire spending falls by almost 10 percent with an override limit in a typical city. That the police and fire spending is estimated to fall by more than overall spending suggests that much of our estimated changes in spending are due to reallocation of existing budgets.
This point is made even more clearly when we estimate the override versus no-override difference separately for the numerator and the denominator of the service ratio. Column 4 of Table 2 presents the override versus no-override limitation difference when the dependent variable is per capita spending on police 18 We also conjectured that statutory limits may be easier to repeal than constitutional limits. However, we found no difference in the postimposition patterns of local government service ratios in response to these two types of limits. 19 Because of the remaining possibility that override limit states may differ in unobserved ways from no-override limit states, we experiment with instrumental variables analysis, in which we instrument for the presence of an override limitation with the constitutional language permitting direct legislation. As mentioned above, states whose constitutions permit direct legislation are substantially less likely to permit overrides in their tax limitations than are states whose constitutions do not permit direct legislation. Because constitutional language does not vary over time, we cannot identify tax limit effects from the timing of limitations, as we do in our primary specifications; however, we can observe whether changes in the dependent variable from the beginning to the end of the sample period are systematically related to changes in limitation status. Since this empirical specification differs somewhat from the one presented in Table 2 , it is useful to begin by presenting what the Table 2 results would be were they estimated using differences from the beginning to the end of the sample period. We observe no substantial difference between these estimates and those presented in Table 2 : the override versus no-override difference in the service ratio is estimated to be Ϫ.285 ( ), very close to the Ϫ.255 reported in Table 2 . On the other hand, once we p p 0.013 instrument for the presence of override limitations, this difference increases in magnitude to Ϫ1.728 ( ). Therefore, we do not place much stock in the magnitude of this IV coefficient; if p p 0.000 anything the IV analysis suggests that the results presented in Table 2 are conservative estimates of the override versus no-override difference. and fire protection. We find that an override limitation is associated with a differential reduction of $5.37 per capita (in 1980 dollars) relative to no-override limitations. This difference is statistically significant at all reasonable significance thresholds and is also economically significant: given that uniformed fire fighter and police officer salaries represent about 80 percent of police and fire spending, this implies that an override limit is associated with approximately one fewer uniformed fire fighter or police officer for each 3,200 residents (given 1980 salaries for fire fighters and police officers.) Given that a typical city had approximately one uniformed fire fighter or police officer per 300 residents in 1979, this implies a cut in the uniformed police and fire force of about 10 percent in a typical city. On the other hand, as seen in column 5 of Table 2 , an override limitation is associated with a differential increase in per capita administrative expenses of just $1.14 per capita (in 1980 dollars) relative to no-override limitations, a difference that is far from statistically significant. Therefore, it appears that the differential reductions in the service ratio are due to reductions in the numerator rather than increases in the denominator.
One concern with the above-mentioned estimates is that the results are driven by cities of a particular population size. Specifically, since our panel consists overwhelmingly of small cities, one might reasonably be concerned that our results are picking up a small-city phenomenon. To address this concern, we report in the bottom part of Table 2 the results of a specification in which all limitation variables are interacted with city population. For ease of interpretation, we present the results evaluated at the seventy-fifth percentile of city population (row 2) and at the twenty-fifth percentile of city population (row 3). We observe that the override versus no-override difference in the service ratio is virtually unchanged between relatively large cities (Ϫ.26) and relatively small cities (Ϫ.27). Breaking out the results into numerator and denominator changes yields proportionately larger differences in magnitude but still not statistical significance. But even these results underscore the central finding that our results appear to be representative of both small and larger cities alike.
The results reported in Table 3 allow us to track the relative changes in the service ratio over time. There is no reason to expect that service ratios would necessarily completely change immediately, as city budgets are determined at fixed intervals and, beyond that, it takes time to transition to a new equilibrium. In addition, it may take some time before budgets begin to feel the effects of tax limit imposition. Therefore, we next estimate separate f and a coefficients for three different postlimit time periods: the 2 years immediately following the limit, the next 3 years after that, and all subsequent years (years 6 and out). Specifically, we estimate the equation
where y takes on one of three values: (1) the 2 years following the tax limit, (2) the 3 years after that, and (3) all subsequent years. We observe that the difference between override cities and no-override cities appears to increase as Note.-Robust p-values of differences (two-tailed test) are reported in parentheses beneath estimated differences. These results are derived from estimation of equations as described in the text. The results control for city-specific effects, city population, local unemployment rate, and time-specific effects. Number of observations p 50,702. Number of cities p 5,147. time passes. Indeed, while over time cities in tax limit states without override provision tend to cut administrative spending relative to police and fire provision (column 1), in override cities the pattern is reversed (column 2). Consequently, the gap between the two sets of responses grows over time and is statistically significant at all time periods. While we observe that this difference between override and no-override limit states is apparently larger in the longer run than the short run, for the rest of this paper we will focus, for simplicity, on models that estimate mean effects rather than differential effects over time.
The bottom part of Table 3 repeats this exercise but adds an additional time period-the 3 years immediately preceding imposition of a tax limitation. Now the comparison time period for the rows marked "first 2 years," "next 3 years," and "subsequent years" is the period 4 or more years before limit imposition. We observe that while in the years immediately preceding tax limitation implementation, no-override limitation cities might have increased their service ratios by more than override limitation cities, this difference is far from statisticallysignificance. The postlimit override versus no-override difference pattern observed in the top part of Table 3 is still present in the bottom part. Therefore, it appears that there was little difference between override and no-override cities in the years immediately prior to tax limitation imposition.
Testing for Heterogeneity Implied by the Model
Our theoretical model describes a situation in which there are no repercussions to the manipulative behavior that we suggest. That is, voters cannot penalize the municipal government for utility-decreasing manipulative behavior by voting with ballots or with feet. However, it is possible to introduce these aspects into our theoretical model; the model would suggest that the difference between override and no-override tax limit cities should decrease as electoral accountability increases or as the threat of migration increases. The purpose of this subsection is to directly test for these possibilities in the data.
We first investigate the possibility of differential responses to tax limits in cities with different political structures. While some local governments have a strong mayor (a mayor-council form of governance), others have a strong city manager (a council-manager form), with any elected mayor assuming a less important role. We were able to make this distinction for about half our cities (2,920 in all), using data from the National League of Cities and the International City/County Management Association. About 48 percent of the cities in override states for which we had sufficient data were run by city managers.
To investigate the possibility that political structure matters, we expand our mean effects model to gauge any differences between the two types of cities. The first row of Table 4 presents the estimated effects of tax limits on the service ratio in mayor-council cities. In these cities, there is no apparent difference between the responses of override cities and the responses of no-override tax limit cities. Indeed, we estimate that for both groups of cities, the service ratio may actually increase following a tax limitation. In contrast, in city-manager cities, there is a large and statistically significant gap between override and nooverride states. The difference in this difference (presented in the third row of the table) is statistically significant and is twice as large in magnitude as in the mean effects case presented in Table 2 .
This result could be driven by some factor correlated with government structure. One possible correlated variable is city population, as mayor-council cities are on average 60 percent larger than city-manager cities. But when we add population interactions to the limit and override state variables (in addition to the city manager interactions already included) the estimated mayor versus manager differences change only slightly.
Our results contrast with earlier results concerning municipal political structures. Several studies have failed to show any significant differences between the two structures in terms of expenditures or efficiency. Note.-Robust p-values of differences (two-tailed test) are reported in parentheses beneath estimated differences. These results are derived from estimation of equations as described in the text. The results control for city-specific effects, city population, local unemployment rate, and time-specific effects. For the city governance and population interaction results, the number of observations p 30,591 and the number of cities p 2,920. For the competition and unemployment results, the number of observations p 50,698 and the number of cities p 5,146.
that the political structure of municipalities matters, at least in terms of the municipality's response to tax limits.
Consider next the effects of migration potential and interjurisdictional competition on a municipality's response to tax limits. The earlier literature exploring the effects of fiscal decentralization on the size of the state and local public sectors generated mixed results. Wallace Oates found no important effects. 21 In contrast, Jeffrey Zax found that decentralization that encourages competition reduces the size of the local public sector, and Randall Eberts and Timothy Gronberg found that decentralization at the metropolitan level decreases local spending relative to income.
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Our theoretical model predicts that the difference between override and nooverride cities' responses to tax limitation measures should decline with the migration potential. If there are fewer competing jurisdictions in a given area, one would anticipate that local governments would tend to be more responsive to constituent needs. This could come either through the increased threat of migration that increased competition would bring or through the increased degree of information about local government production that citizens could witness if other governments were nearby.
We test whether the difference between override and no-override cities decreases with the level of competition by interacting our limitation measures, again in the mean effects model, with a Herfindahl index of local government population shares in the jurisdiction's county. (Other measures of competition, such as the jurisdiction's total population share in the county or the number of unique jurisdictions, yield comparable results, as do measures of competition in which the relevant geographic scope is defined at the metropolitan area level. We report the results using county-level measures, rather than metropolitan arealevel measures, because metropolitan area boundaries change over time, making the relevant range of competition no less arbitrarily defined at the metropolitan area level than at the county level, and because more than half of our observations are outside metropolitan areas.) The results of this exercise are presented in the middle part of Table 4 .
We observe that in high-competition situations, the difference between override and no-override cities' responses to tax limitations is about half of that reported in the first row of Table 2 . For example, the difference is a change of Ϫ.116 in the service ratio if competition is measured at the twenty-fifth percentile of market concentration (a concentration index of .087, or the equivalent of having about 12 equal-sized jurisdictions in the county). On the other hand, when a jurisdiction faces low competition levels, the difference between override and no-override cities' responses is large in magnitude and statistical significance. If concentration is measured at its seventy-fifth percentile (a concentration index of .371, or the equivalent of having fewer than three equal-sized jurisdictions in the county), the estimated difference is Ϫ.290, a sum more than twice the size of the highcompetition case. The difference in these differences, given in the sixth row of the table, is also statistically significant. Hence, the evidence is supportive of our model's suggestion that the behavior predicted by our model should be attenuated as competition increases. As in the case of city governance, results are not driven by population differences in high-competition and low-competition places; adding population interactions does not change the estimated differences between high-and low-competition places at all.
It may be the case that these behaviors might vary depending on the business cycle. One might expect that manipulation would be more successful during good economic times than during bad economic times, if demand for local public goods is normal (as has been shown by Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman, and others) . 23 On the other hand, one might expect that local governments might be more eager to seek an override (and potentially, therefore, to manipulate voters) when economic times are tight and local revenues are more in danger of shrinking. Our theory is silent on which of these outcomes is most likely to occur, but this remains an interesting issue. The bottom part of Table 4 directly explores these possibilities by interacting the limit variables with the current local unemployment rate. While we observe that there is an economically and statistically significant difference between override city responses and no-override city responses even in high unemployment rate areas (seventy-fifth percentile of unemployment rates-or 8.8 percent), the difference is more than twice as great in low unemployment rate areas (twenty-fifth percentile of unemployment rates-or 6.0 percent). The difference between these differences is statistically significant as well as being large in magnitude. Therefore, the evidence suggests that cities facing good economic times are more likely to act in a manner consistent with seeking an override when presented with the opportunity to do so.
Subspending Category Evidence
The preceding evidence focuses entirely on between-spending-category changes. But, as mentioned above, there are productive services provided by central administration and general government, and the police and fire budgets considered above include spending both on uniformed personnel and on administrative services. In this subsection, we present difference-in-difference evidence on the effects of tax limits on the within-spending-category allocation of resources.
We first consider whether override and no-override tax limit cities responded systematically differently to tax limitations in changing their ratio of uniformed police officers to central police administration staff. Here, we use data from before and after the tax revolt (1975 and 1992) for the 91 cities that had a population of 100,000 or more in 1993 and that also had police staff records for both years. These data come from reports published in the Municipal Year Book.
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The results of this comparison are presented in the first row of Table 5 . We observe that while no-override tax limit cities tended to increase their ratio of uniformed police to police administration between 1975 and 1992, override tax Note.-Robust p-values of differences (two-tailed test) are reported in parentheses beneath estimated differences. For the police ratio, the number of cities p 91. For the school ratio, the number of school districts p 9,069.
limit cities tended to decrease this ratio at the same time. The difference between the two sets of responses is a ratio change of more than 2.3, significant at the 1 percent level. This is a large number, considering that the 1975 mean of this ratio is just over 4.3.
We also consider the differential effects of override and no-override tax limits in a completely different context, that of school provision. Specifically, we measure the ratio of teachers to administrative staff (both measured in full-timeequivalent terms) in two cross sections, 1971-72 and 1991-92 academic years, for 9,069 school districts, the majority of districts in the country. The second row of Table 5 presents this comparison. We observe that the patterns in the school case closely parallel those in the police case-no-override school districts tended to increase their teacher-administrator ratio following a tax limit, while those in override school districts tended to reduce this ratio. The difference in this difference, presented in column 3, is more than 2.1 teachers per administrator, significant at the 6 percent level, and a large number given that the 1971-72 mean of this ratio is 8.8 teachers per administrator. This result, paired with the uniformed police result presented above, provides suggestive corroborative evidence that our main findings are truly indicative of systematic changes in the ratio of services to administration in cities following tax limitation measures.
III. Is Manipulation Successful?
The preceding discussion suggests that cities in override states tend to decrease service ratios, relative to cities subject to tax limitations without override provisions. Our explanation for this finding is that they seek to increase revenues (or rather, to reduce the decrease in revenues) by convincing voters that the marginal value of spending is high. Although the ideal next step would be to determine what types of cities were successful in securing an override of a statewide limit, we do not have the data to do so. As an alternative, we have the data to show the relationship between changes in service ratios and later changes in the own-source revenue.
Here, we relate changes in per capita own-source revenues in the 6 years following a tax limitation to changes in the service ratio immediately following the tax limit's imposition (that is, the first 2 years.) If the cities that cut their service ratios the most in the years immediately following the tax limitation later saw the largest revenue gains (or, more accurately, the smallest revenue losses), this would provide evidence, albeit indirect, of successful manipulation. When we regress the change in per capita own-source revenues in the 6 years following limit imposition against the change in the service ratio in the 2 years following limit imposition, the estimated coefficient for override cities is Ϫ13.8 ( p p . This implies that a city that cut its service ratio by .5 would, after 6 0.021) years, face per capita own-source revenues that are nearly $7 greater (in 1980 dollars) than would a city that did not cut its service ratio at all. On the other hand, if we estimate the same relationship for no-override limitation cities, the estimated coefficient is 1.2 , which suggests that there is no rela-( p p 0.863) tionship between service ratio changes and subsequent revenue changes in nooverride limitation cities. The difference between the override city relationship and the no-override city relationship is significant at the 9 percent level. This distinction is important because it suggests that the relationship found in override cities is not reflective of a "natural" relationship between changes in the service ratio and changes in revenues but rather is evidence of differential success in overriding the tax limits.
An additional piece of evidence comes from recent work by David Cutler, Douglas Elmendorf, and Richard Zeckhauser, who find that communities with the largest initial revenue cuts following Massachusetts's Proposition 2½ were the most likely to subsequently override the tax cap. 25 We note that this result is not inconsistent with our finding that cities facing good economic times are more likely to behave in a manner that is consistent with manipulative government behavior than are cities facing bad economic times. There is no direct relationship between economic conditions and cross-sectional differences in revenue losses following Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts. While Cutler and his coauthors provide no evidence on whether these communities were also the ones with the largest reductions in the service ratio, the fact that they find that the majority of constrained communities override the tax limit provides some evidence that additional information was revealed to voters following the passage of the tax limit. In sum, while we have no hard evidence that the communities that were most manipulative ended up with the highest revenues (or lowest revenue cuts) following tax limits, all of the suggestive evidence is uniform in supporting this notion.
IV. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that some cities manipulate input ratios in an attempt to persuade voters to override statewide tax limits. The evidence is based on a comprehensive set of panel data on the service provision of local governments in the United States in the years surrounding the tax revolt of the 1970s and 1980s. Our results suggest that tax limits decreased service ratios, with the largest reductions in cities with override options, less mobile citizens, and the city-manager form of government, as well as in cities facing good economic times. These estimated effects are large both in magnitude as well as in statistical significance.
Our results must be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, our measure of the service ratio is imperfect, though it is a reasonable measure given the data limitations and the finding of McGuire and Rueben that the most successful override measures are ones that explicitly mention police or fire protection.
26 Second, we do not know precisely when cities in a particular state were first threatened with a tax limit; we simply know when the limit was imposed. Third, we do not observe which cities were actually successful in overriding statewide limits. Subject to these qualifications, our analysis suggests that local governments sought to mitigate the effects of tax limits by behaving in a manipulative fashion, perhaps in an attempt to persuade voters to override statewide limits. Note.-Robust p-values of differences (two-tailed test) are reported in parentheses beneath estimated differences. These results are derived from estimation of equations as described in the text. The results also control for cityspecific effects and time-specific effects. Number of observations p 50,702. Number of cities p 5,147.
APPENDIX
